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Abstract
Inspired by a paper of R. W. Rosenthal, we investigate generalized Nash-equilibria of
integer programming games. We show that generalized Nash-equilibria always exist and are
related to an optimal solution of a so-called N-fold integer program. This link allows us to
establish some polynomial time complexity results about solving this optimization problem
and its inverse counter-part.
1 A class of IP games
There are N players. For i = 1, . . . , N , let Ai ∈ Zd
i×n, bi ∈ Zd
i
, and ui ∈ Zn+. Each player i selects
a solution xi to the linear Diophantine system Aix = bi, 0 ≤ x ≤ ui,x ∈ Zn, which is referred
to as a pure strategy of player i. The costs to i for playing his strategy depend on the strategies
chosen by the other players. A player is called satisfied if his selected strategy is cost-minimal
given the strategies of all other players. A pure Nash-equilibrium is an assignment of strategies to
players such that all players are satisfied simultaneously. Note that in the described situation each
player can choose his strategy independently of the strategies of the other players. In contrast to
this, one could impose a coupling constraint on the possible strategies for all players together, say∑N
i=1 B
ixi ≤ b0 for matrices Bi ∈ Zm×n, i = 1, . . . , N , and for some b0 ∈ Zm. Again, a player
is called satisfied if his selected strategy is cost-minimal given the strategies of all other players.
Clearly, his strategy has to obey the coupling constraint resulting from fixing the strategies of the
other players. A generalized Nash-equilibrium is an assignment of strategies to players such that
all players are satisfied simultaneously in this more general situation. Clearly, we can model the
unrestricted situtation by simply putting all Bi to zero matrices.
Let us be more specific now. Let there be given functions cj : R+ → R+ that evaluate the cost of
element j = 1, . . . , n. In our setting, we have costs cj(y) if all the players together use y =
∑N
i=1 x
i
j
1
units of element j. In formulae, the costs assigned to player k are
n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=1
yij
)
−
n∑
j=1
cj

 N∑
i=1,i6=k
yij

 = n∑
j=1
cj

ykj + N∑
i=1,i6=k
yij

− n∑
j=1
cj

 N∑
i=1,i6=k
yij

 .
From now on, we assume that cj is a monotonously increasing function for all j = 1, . . . , n. The
following result is an extension of a theorem by Rosenthal [6].
Theorem 1 All games of the above class with at least one choice (x1, . . . ,xN ) of strategies that
fulfill the coupling constraint
∑N
i=1 B
ixi ≤ b0 possess at least one generalized Nash-equilibrium.
Proof. Consider the problem
min


n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=1
xij
)
: Aixi = bi, 0 ≤ xi ≤ ui,
N∑
i=1
Bixi ≤ b0,xi ∈ Zn+

 . (1)
By assumption, this problem has at least one solution. Moreover, as for j = 1, . . . , n, the functions
cj are monotonously increasing, they are all bounded from below, and thus, Problem (1) has
an optimal solution. We claim that any optimal solution to Problem (1) is a generalized Nash-
equilibrium.
Let (y1, . . . ,yN ) be an optimal solution to Problem (1). For the purpose of deriving a contradiction,
suppose that (y1, . . . ,yN ) is not a generalized Nash-equilibrium. Then there exists some player i,
w.l.o.g. i = 1, and a strategy z1 such that z1 has lower costs
n∑
j=1
cj
(
z1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
−
n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=2
yij
)
than the costs
n∑
j=1
cj
(
y1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
−
n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=2
yij
)
of strategy y1 given fixed strategies y2, . . . ,yN . We obtain
n∑
j=1
cj
(
z1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
−
n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=2
yij
)
<
n∑
j=1
cj
(
y1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
−
n∑
j=1
cj
(
N∑
i=2
yij
)
,
that is,
n∑
j=1
cj
(
z1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
<
n∑
j=1
cj
(
y1j +
N∑
i=2
yij
)
.
Thus, (z1,y2, . . . ,yN ) is a feasible solution to Problem (1) with strictly smaller costs than the
solution (y1,y2, . . . ,yN ), contracting optimality. 
The following remark seems in order. Notice that the objective function in Problem(1) can be
interpreted as the costs of a provider to account for realizing all the strategies. The costs assigned
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to a player, however, are marginal costs. If all cj , j = 1, . . . , n, are nonlinear convex functions,
the sum of costs for all players exceeds the costs for the provider, i.e., it generates a gain for the
provider. The more players play the bigger this gain gets. This fact motivates the provider to have
all his players being satisfied. Interestingly, each player is satisfied when they cooperate to minimize
the costs of the provider.
2 Complexity results for convex cost functions
Let us assume in this section that all matrices Ai are equal to A, that all matrices Bi are equal
to B, and that the cj : R+ → R+, j = 1, . . . , n, are univariate convex functions. This latter
condition is quite natural, since it simply means that the difference functions cj(y + 1) − cj(y)
are monotonously increasing, that is, the cost for one extra unit of component j is monotonously
increasing the more of component j is used.
With the simplifications, Problem (1) has a nice combinatorial structure:
min
8>>>>>><
>>>>>>:
nX
j=1
cj(yj ) :
0
BBBBBBBB@
In In · · · In −In 0
B B · · · B 0 In
A 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 A · · · 0 0
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
.
0 0 · · · A 0 0
1
CCCCCCCCA
0
BBBBBBBBBBBB@
x1
x2
x3
.
.
.
xN
y
s
1
CCCCCCCCCCCCA
=
0
BBBBBBBBBB@
0
b0
b1
b2
.
.
.
bN
1
CCCCCCCCCCA
,
0
BBBBBB@
x1
x2
.
.
.
xN
1
CCCCCCA
≤
0
BBBBBB@
u1
u2
.
.
.
uN
1
CCCCCCA
, x
1
, . . . , x
N
, y ∈ Z
n
+
9>>>>>>=
>>>>>>;
. (2)
This structure allows us to prove a complexity result about the computation of the generalized
Nash-equilibrium. However, in order to prove this, we need to introduce the notion of the Graver
basis of a matrix together with a few important facts about these bases and about N -fold integer
programs.
For D ∈ Zd×n let G(D) denote the Graver basis of D. This Graver basis consists exactly of those
nonzero elements z in ker(A) ∩ Zn = {x : Ax = 0} ∩ Zn that cannot be written as a non-trivial
sum z = u+ v where u,v ∈ ker(A) ∩ Zn and where u and v have the same sign-pattern, that is,
ujvj ≥ 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n. For any matrix D, the Graver basis G(D) is a finite set [2], and it
has the nice property that it provides an optimality certificate for the family of separable convex
integer minimization problems min
{∑n
j=1 fj(xj) : Dx = d, 0 ≤ x ≤ u,x ∈ Z
n
+
}
for any choice of
convex functions fj : R → R, j = 1, . . . , n, and for any choice of d ∈ Z
d [2, 5]. That is, for any
choice of the input data and for any feasible solution x0 of the problem, x0 is optimal if and only
if there is no g ∈ G(D) such that x0 + g is feasible and
∑n
i=j fj(x
0
j + gj) <
∑n
i=j fj(x
0
j ).
Having a finite optimality certificate available, one can augment any given feasible solution of the
problem to an optimal solution by iteratively walking along directions provided by the optimality
certificate. If a simple greedy augmentation is followed, only a polynomial number (in the encoding
length of the input data) of Graver basis augmentation steps is needed to construct an initial feasible
solution and to augment it to optimality [1, 3]. Thus, if we had a Graver basis G(D) that is of
polynomial size in 〈D〉, this augmentation approach provides a polynomial time algorithm to solve
min
{∑n
j=1 fj(xj) : Dx = d, 0 ≤ x ≤ u,x ∈ Z
n
+
}
.
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Using results of [4, 7], it was shown in [1] that for fixed matrices A and B (of appropriate dimen-
sions) the sizes and the encoding lengths of the Graver bases of the family of matrices
[A,B](N) :=


B B · · · B
A
A
. . .
A


increase only polynomially in N . Thus, if we choose D = [A,B](N) the corresponding separable
convex minimization problem, a so-called N -fold integer program, can be solved in polynomial
time for fixed matrices A and B [1, 3]. The following lemma shows that for fixed matrices A and
B also the Graver bases of Problem (2) increase only polynomially in N . And thus Problem (2)
can be solved in polynomial time as claimed.
Lemma 2 Let A ∈ Zd×n and B ∈ Zm×n be fixed matrices, and let
[A,B]
(N)
:=


In In · · · In −In 0
B B · · · B 0 In
A 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 A · · · 0 0
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 · · · A 0 0


.
Then the sizes of the Graver bases of [A,B]
(N)
, N = 1, 2, . . ., and their encoding lengths increase
only polynomially in N .
Proof. Consider the matrix
C(N) :=


In −In 0 In −In 0 · · · In −In 0
0 0 In 0 0 In · · · 0 0 In
B 0 0 B 0 0 · · · B 0 0
A 0 0 0 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
0 0 0 A 0 0 · · · 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 0 0 · · · A 0 0


.
As this is the matrix of an N -fold IP composed of block matrices (A 0 0 ) and
(
In −In 0
0 0 In
B 0 0
)
, the sizes
of the Graver bases of C(N), N = 1, 2, . . ., and their encoding lengths increase only polynomially
in N , given that A, B, and n are constant.
The matrix [A,B]
(N)
is composed out of columns of C(N) and thus any Graver basis element of
[A,B]
(N)
filled with zeros for the additional columns of C(N) defines a Graver basis element of
C(N). Therefore, also the sizes of the Graver bases of [A,B]
(N)
, N = 1, 2, . . ., and their encoding
lengths increase only polynomially in N , given that A, B, and n are constant. 
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Theorem 3 Assume that A ∈ Zd×n and B ∈ Zm×n are fixed and assume that all cj : R+ → R+,
j = 1, . . . , n, are univariate convex functions given by evaluation oracles. Moreover, let M be a
bound for cj
(∑N
i=1 x
i
j
)
for all j and for all feasible selections of strategies for all players. Then
Problem (2) can be solved, and hence a generalized Nash-equilibrium can be computed, in time that
is polynomial in N , in 〈M,b0,b1, . . . ,bN ,u1, . . . ,uN 〉, and in the number of calls of evaluation
oracles.
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that the Graver basis of the problem matrix [A,B]
(N)
has a
polynomial-size encoding length in the encoding length of the input data. The result now follows
from Theorem 7 in [3], which bounds the number of augmentations so as to reach an optimal
solution of Problem (2). 
3 Inverse optimization problem
A (generalized) Nash-equilibrium satisfies all players simultaneously. It requires that cost functions
cj , j = 1, . . . , n, are given. Conversely, one may ask for finding cost functions cj , j = 1, . . . , n, that
turn a given set {x1, . . . ,xN} of strategies into a Nash-equilibrium. Such inverse optimization
problems are fundamental for a variety of applications, such as quality control in production
systems, portfolio optimization, or production capacity planning, see [9] for details and references.
The problem in this generality is hopeless unless some structure on the cost functions cj , j =
1, . . . , n, can be assumed. We study the situation that each cj has the form cj(y) = λjfj(y) for
some fixed given convex function fj : R+ → R+ and some λj ∈ R+ that can be adjusted.
We can abstract from this setting slightly and define a general inverse integer optimization problem
as follows.
Lemma 4 Consider the problem (IIOP): Given a polyhedron P = {x : Dx = d,0 ≤ x ≤ u} ⊆ Rn,
x∗ ∈ P ∩ Zn and convex functions fj : R → R. Do there exist λj ∈ R+, j = 1, . . . , n, not all
simultaneously zero, such that x∗ minimizes f(x) :=
∑n
j=1 λjfj(xj) over all x ∈ P ∩ Z
n.
(a) (IIOP) is in coNP.
(b) (IIOP) is solvable in time polynomial in 〈G(D)〉, where G(D) denotes the Graver basis of D.
Proof. By Theorem 3 in [3], x∗ minimizes f(x) =
∑n
j=1 λjfj(xj) over all x ∈ P ∩ Z
n if and if
only if f(x∗ + g) ≥ f(x∗) for all g ∈ G(D) such that x∗ + g ∈ P . Clearly, this can be checked in
polynomial time in 〈G(D)〉, showing (b).
To show (a), observe that this criterion is equivalent to asking for a solution to the following system
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in variables λ1, . . . , λn:
n∑
j=1
λjfj(x
∗
j + gj) ≥
n∑
j=1
λjfj(x
∗
j ) for all g ∈ G(D) such that x
∗ + g ∈ P,
λ1, . . . , λn ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
λj > 0,
or equivalently, letting H = {g ∈ G(D) such that x∗ + g ∈ P},
n∑
j=1
[
fj(x
∗
j + gj)− fj(x
∗
j )
]
λj ≥ 0 for all g ∈ H,
λ1, . . . , λn ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
λj > 0.
If this system has no solution, then there exists a subsystem
n∑
j=1
[
fj(x
∗
j + gj)− fj(x
∗
j )
]
λj ≥ 0 for all g ∈ H
′,
λ1, . . . , λn ≥ 0,
n∑
j=1
λj > 0,
for H ′ ⊆ H of at most |H ′| ≤ n + 1 inequalities having no solution. (This is a consequence of
Caratheodory’s theorem and the Farkas-Lemma, see p. 94 in [8].)
Now we can apply standard linear programming technology: From the Farkas-Lemma, it follows
that the latter system is not solvable if and only if there exists a vector v = (vg)g∈H′ ∈ Q
|H′|
+ such
that ∑
g∈H′
vg
[
fj(x
∗
j + gj)− fj(x
∗
j )
]
< 0 for all j = 1, . . . , n.
This is a polynomially sized certificate for the “No.”-answer to (IIOP), showing (a). 
Notice that Lemma 4 (b) implies that if a Graver basis happens to be of polynomial size in the en-
coding length of the input data 〈D, u〉 of the integer program, then the corresponding optimization
problem (IIOP) can be solved in polynomial time in 〈D, u〉.
Returning to Problem (2), we want to solve its inverse counter-part. Note that again we assume
that each cj has the form cj(y) = λjfj(y) for some fixed given convex function fj : R+ → R+ and
some λj ∈ R+ that can be adjusted.
Corollary 5 Let the matrices A and B be fixed and assume that all fj : R+ → R+, j = 1, . . . , n,
are univariate convex functions given by evaluation oracles. Moreover, let M be a bound for
6
cj
(∑N
i=1 x
i
j
)
for all j and for all feasible selections of strategies for all players. Then the in-
verse integer optimization problem corresponding to Problem (2) is solvable in time polynomial in
N , in 〈M,x∗,b0,b1, . . . ,bN ,u1, . . . ,uN 〉, and in the number of calls of evaluation oracles.
Proof. From Lemma 2, we know that the Graver basis of the problem matrix [A,B]
(N)
of Problem
(2) is of polynomial size in N . The result thus follows from Theorem 4(b). 
4 Extension of results
Let us call the pair of matrices (Ai, Bi) the type of player i. While in Problem (1) all players could
have a different type, we assumed in Problem (2) that all players were of the same type (A,B).
Let us assume now that there is a constant number of possible player types (Ai, Bi) represented
by pairs of matrices (A¯i, B¯i), i = 1, . . . , t, as in Problem (1). Despite the more general problem,
the complexity results of the last two sections still hold.
Theorem 6 Assume that there is a constant number t of possible player types represented by pairs
(A¯i, B¯i), i = 1, . . . , t, of fixed matrices A¯i and B¯i, i = 1, . . . , t. For i = 1, . . . , N , select one of
these pairs (A¯i, B¯i), i = 1, . . . , t, as the type (Ai, Bi) of player i. Finally, let M be a bound for
cj
(∑N
i=1 x
i
j
)
for all j and for all feasible selections of strategies for all players.
(a) Problem (1) can be solved in time polynomial in N , in 〈M,b0,b1, . . . ,bN ,u1, . . . ,uN 〉, and
in the number of calls of evaluation oracles.
(b) Assume that each cj has the form cj(y) = λjfj(y) for some fixed convex function fj : R+ →
R+ given by evaluation oracles and some λj ∈ R+ that can be adjusted. Then the inverse
integer optimization problem corresponding to Problem (1) is solvable in time polynomial in
N , in 〈M,x∗,b0,b1, . . . ,bN ,u1, . . . ,uN 〉, and in the number of calls of evaluation oracles.
Proof. As in the proofs above, it suffices to show that under our assumptions the sizes of the
Graver bases of the problem matrices of Problem (1) increase only polynomially with N . This can
be seen by considering the matrices



 A¯
1 0 ... 0
0 A¯2 ... 0
0 0
. . . 0
0 0 ... A¯t

 , ( B¯1 B¯2 ... B¯t )


(N)
=


B¯1 B¯2 . . . B¯t . . . 0 0 0 0
A¯1 0 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0
0 A¯2 . . . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0
0 0
. . . 0 . . . 0 0 0 0
0 0 . . . A¯t . . . 0 0 0 0
...
...
...
...
. . .
...
...
...
...
0 0 0 0 . . . B¯1 B¯2 . . . B¯t
0 0 0 0 . . . A¯1 0 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 A¯2 . . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0
. . . 0
0 0 0 0 . . . 0 0 . . . A¯t


,
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which are matrices of N -fold integer programs. Thus, as these N -fold matrices are built from fixed
blocks, the sizes and encoding lengths their Graver bases increase only polynomially with N . As
the problem matrix of Problem (1) can be obtained from the matrix by deleting columns and
then zero rows, the sizes and the encoding lengths of the Graver bases of the problem matrices of
Problem (1) increase only polynomially with N , and thus, (a) and (b) both follow. 
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